On 27/11/2024 15:43, Stefano Brivio wrote:
...to quickly suppress a false positive from Coverity,
which assumes
that iov_size is 0 and 'dlen' might overflow as a result (with hdrlen
being 66). An ASSERT() in tcp_vu_sock_recv() already guarantees that
iov_size(iov, buf_cnt) here is anyway greater than 'hdrlen'.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com>
---
This applies on top of "[PATCH] Fix build on 32bit target"
tcp_vu.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tcp_vu.c b/tcp_vu.c
index 05e2d1d..a1510d9 100644
--- a/tcp_vu.c
+++ b/tcp_vu.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ int tcp_vu_data_from_sock(const struct ctx *c, struct tcp_tap_conn
*conn)
for (i = 0, check = NULL; i < head_cnt; i++) {
struct iovec *iov = &elem[head[i]].in_sg[0];
int buf_cnt = head[i + 1] - head[i];
- int dlen = iov_size(iov, buf_cnt) - hdrlen;
+ ssize_t dlen = iov_size(iov, buf_cnt) - hdrlen;
vu_set_vnethdr(vdev, iov->iov_base, buf_cnt);
Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier(a)redhat.com>